Chad
Revolutionary fervor and rhetoric are not enough to solve the financial problems AES member countries are facing in the Sahel. For this reason, the transitional governments of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are exploring alternative sources of financing. Mali and Burkina Faso, in particular, are gauging the possibility of joining the BRICS and have signaled this intention to Russia. Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop expressed Bamako’s interest in joining the bloc of emerging economies in an interview with the Russian agency “Novosti,” though he noted that no formal application has been submitted. Later, Burkina Faso’s Prime Minister, Kyelem de Tambela, expressed a similar intent to the Russian ambassador to Ouagadougou, Igor Martynov, stating that joining BRICS could help “counter the dominance of the dollar and euro” and promote “fairer international trade.” However, these declarations appear more as expressions of hope, or perhaps excessive optimism, regarding BRICS, primarily driven by AES countries’ desire for increased international prestige and strengthened cooperation, particularly in financing, a goal that may remain unmet.
At the same time, AES countries are adopting alternative financing strategies, such as exerting pressure on mining companies. A case in point is the temporary detention of some employees of the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold. Malian authorities did not publicly disclose reasons for the detention, which was resolved through confidential negotiations between the government and the company. Barrick Gold had previously criticized the new mining code introduced by the transitional government, allowing the state to claim up to 30% of the revenues from mining projects. Barrick Gold holds 80% of the companies that operate the Loulo-Gounkoto mining complex, near the Senegalese border, and had already reported divergences with the government. The Barrick Gold case illustrates Mali’s need to secure liquidity, a need shared by the governments of Niger and Burkina Faso, which are also dealing with debts incurred by Bamako to fund basic services and pay for the Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) services.
Chad, on the other hand, has taken a smoother path toward stabilizing public debt with the support of the UAE. The government of N'Djamena secured a loan of 300 billion CFA francs (about $500 million) from the Abu Dhabi Development Fund. Chadian President Mahamat Déby announced the deal after a trip to the UAE, where he met President Mohammed bin Zayed. This loan, one of the largest in Chad's history, represents 15% of the national budget for 2024 and comes with particularly favorable terms, including a 1% interest rate and a 14-year duration. This financing underscores Chad's strategic importance to the UAE and rewards the debt-reduction strategy pursued by Déby's government, centered on joining the G20’s Common Framework, which has already led to a significant reduction in N'Djamena's public debt. It remains to be seen how effectively the Chadian government will utilize this loan. N'Djamena’s plan is ambitious, with key infrastructure development and improvements to basic services, but the risks of corruption and administrative inefficiencies could undermine long-term success.
On the front of armed insurgency, this month saw an interview with Hamadoun Kouffa, one of the leaders of JNIM and head of the Macina katiba, a brigade of the al-Qaeda-linked group mainly composed of Peul members. Kouffa’s remarks highlight significant shifts in insurgency dynamics over the past year. First, the crackdown by the transitional government and the Wagner Group has driven parts of the population to support JNIM, particularly in central and northern Mali. Kouffa also indicated that JNIM is expanding its actions towards West African coastal countries, notably Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Kouffa stated that JNIM is open to negotiations with Sahel governments and “anyone who wishes,” clarifying, however, that the application of Sharia remains a fundamental requirement for the group. His statements reflect the worsening of the insurgency, now unfolding on two fronts: in the center, where jihadist groups are fighting the Bamako government and Russian mercenaries, and in the north, where Tuareg armed groups have already repelled two government offensives.
Download the October 2024 report
| Head of state | Mahamat Déby Itno |
| Head of Government | Allamaye Halina |
| Institutional Form | Presidential Republic government under military council |
| Capital | N'Djamena |
| Legislative Power | Unicameral, National Assembly (188 Members) |
| Judicial Power | Supreme Court (composed of a chief judge, 3 chamber Presidents and 12 judges or councillors; divided into 3 chambers); Constitutional Council (consisting of 3 judges and 6 jurists) |
| Ambassador to Italy | Mariam Al Moussa (Ambassador to Germany, also responsible for Italy) |
| Total Area kmq | 1.284.000 km2 |
| Land | 1.259.200 km2 |
| Weather | Tropical in the south, desertic in the north |
| Natural resources | oil, uranium, natron, kaolin, fish (Lake Chad), gold, limestone, sand and gravel, salt |
| Economic summary | Oil provides about 60% of export gains, while cotton, livestock and Arabic gum provide most of the non-oil export revenue. The Chadian economy is also, based on foreign assistance and foreign capital for most public and private sector investments, but investments are difficult due to limited infrastructure and the lack of skilled workers |
| GDP | $11.78 billion (Dec. 2021) |
| Pro-capite GDP (Purchasing power parity) | $605 (Dec. 2021) |
| Exports | $1.5 billion (2020) |
| Export partner | China 24.4%, France 19.4%, Germany 15.9%, UAE 14.4%, Chinese Taipei 13% (2020) |
| Imports | $1.01 billion (2020) |
| Import partner | China 29.4%, UAE 18.4%, India 6.11%, Türkiye 4.1% (2020) |
| Trade With Italy | $ 9,5 million (2021) |
| Population | 17.963.211 |
| Population Growth | +3,09% (2022 est.) |
| Ethnicities | Sara (Ngambaye/Sara/ Madjingaye/Mbaye) 30.5%, Kanembu/Bornu/Buduma 9.8%, Arab 9.7%, Wadai/Maba/Masalit/Mimi 7%, Gorane 5.8%, Masa/Musseye/Musgum 4.9%, many others (2014-15 est.) |
| Languages | French, Arabic, Sara (in the south), more than 120 different languages and dialects |
| Religions | Muslims 52%, Christians 44% |
| Urbanization | 24,1% (2022 est.) |
| Literacy | 22,3% |
Independent since 1960, the Republic of Chad is located in North-Central Africa. It borders with Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon to the west, and the Central African Republic to the south. The population is estimated to be 18 million, divided into 20 ethnic groups. The official language is French.
Thanks to its strategic position and the capabilities of its armed forces, Chad is a key country for the stability of the Broader Mediterranean region. For these reasons, it has become a privileged partner for security operations in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions.
Chad’s economy is still mainly focused on traditional agriculture, with 80 percent of the population depending on subsistence farming for a living. Although the country exports oil, gold, oil seeds and cotton, these activities do not seem to be sufficient to promote adequate economic development. While trade volumes between Chad and Italy are low ($ 9,5 million in 2021), overall relations between the two countries are quite strong and characterised by structured partnerships, especially in the defence and development sectors. In 2017, Italy and Chad signed a defence cooperation agreement aimed at supporting Chadian security forces in the fight against jihadist terrorism in the Lake Chad and Sahel regions. Together with Niger, Chad is also a strategic priority partner for the Italian Development Cooperation agency, which promotes relief projects in the country, focussing mainly on the prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition and on the provision of food assistance and health care, especially to children.
