Revolutionary fervor and rhetoric are not enough to solve the financial problems AES member countries are facing in the Sahel. For this reason, the transitional governments of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are exploring alternative sources of financing. Mali and Burkina Faso, in particular, are gauging the possibility of joining the BRICS and have signaled this intention to Russia. Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop expressed Bamako’s interest in joining the bloc of emerging economies in an interview with the Russian agency “Novosti,” though he noted that no formal application has been submitted. Later, Burkina Faso’s Prime Minister, Kyelem de Tambela, expressed a similar intent to the Russian ambassador to Ouagadougou, Igor Martynov, stating that joining BRICS could help “counter the dominance of the dollar and euro” and promote “fairer international trade.” However, these declarations appear more as expressions of hope, or perhaps excessive optimism, regarding BRICS, primarily driven by AES countries’ desire for increased international prestige and strengthened cooperation, particularly in financing, a goal that may remain unmet.
At the same time, AES countries are adopting alternative financing strategies, such as exerting pressure on mining companies. A case in point is the temporary detention of some employees of the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold. Malian authorities did not publicly disclose reasons for the detention, which was resolved through confidential negotiations between the government and the company. Barrick Gold had previously criticized the new mining code introduced by the transitional government, allowing the state to claim up to 30% of the revenues from mining projects. Barrick Gold holds 80% of the companies that operate the Loulo-Gounkoto mining complex, near the Senegalese border, and had already reported divergences with the government. The Barrick Gold case illustrates Mali’s need to secure liquidity, a need shared by the governments of Niger and Burkina Faso, which are also dealing with debts incurred by Bamako to fund basic services and pay for the Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) services.
Chad, on the other hand, has taken a smoother path toward stabilizing public debt with the support of the UAE. The government of N'Djamena secured a loan of 300 billion CFA francs (about $500 million) from the Abu Dhabi Development Fund. Chadian President Mahamat Déby announced the deal after a trip to the UAE, where he met President Mohammed bin Zayed. This loan, one of the largest in Chad's history, represents 15% of the national budget for 2024 and comes with particularly favorable terms, including a 1% interest rate and a 14-year duration. This financing underscores Chad's strategic importance to the UAE and rewards the debt-reduction strategy pursued by Déby's government, centered on joining the G20’s Common Framework, which has already led to a significant reduction in N'Djamena's public debt. It remains to be seen how effectively the Chadian government will utilize this loan. N'Djamena’s plan is ambitious, with key infrastructure development and improvements to basic services, but the risks of corruption and administrative inefficiencies could undermine long-term success.
On the front of armed insurgency, this month saw an interview with Hamadoun Kouffa, one of the leaders of JNIM and head of the Macina katiba, a brigade of the al-Qaeda-linked group mainly composed of Peul members. Kouffa’s remarks highlight significant shifts in insurgency dynamics over the past year. First, the crackdown by the transitional government and the Wagner Group has driven parts of the population to support JNIM, particularly in central and northern Mali. Kouffa also indicated that JNIM is expanding its actions towards West African coastal countries, notably Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Kouffa stated that JNIM is open to negotiations with Sahel governments and “anyone who wishes,” clarifying, however, that the application of Sharia remains a fundamental requirement for the group. His statements reflect the worsening of the insurgency, now unfolding on two fronts: in the center, where jihadist groups are fighting the Bamako government and Russian mercenaries, and in the north, where Tuareg armed groups have already repelled two government offensives.
Download the October 2024 reportThe speech by the President of Niger Mohamed Bazoum at the event “Italy, Niger. Europe, Africa. Two continents. One Destiny”, organized by Med-Or Foundation
On Thursday 1 December, the event “Italy, Niger. Europe, Africa. Two continents. One destiny” by Med-Or Foundation was held at Luiss Guido Carli. It saw the participation of the President of the Republic of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum
The number of African countries thinking of developing a nuclear programme is growing, while collaboration projects with Russia and China are increasing. By Emanuele Rossi
Head of state | Mohamed Bazoum |
Head of Government | Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou |
Institutional Form | Unitary semi-presidential republic |
Capital | Niamey |
Legislative Power | Unicameral National Assembly |
Judicial Power | Constitutional Court (7 judges); High Court of Justice (7 Members) |
Ambassador to Italy | Fatimata Cheiffou |
Total Area kmq | 1.267.000 km2 |
Land | 1.266.700 km2 |
Weather | Desert; mostly hot, dry, dusty; tropical in the extreme south |
Natural resources | Uranium, coal, iron ore, tin, phosphates, gold, molybdenum, gypsum, salt, oil |
Economic summary | The economy is based on a subsistence farming and livestock. The agriculture contributes for the 40% to the nigerin GDP and provides livelihoods for over 80% of the population; there is also one of the largest uranium deposits in the world. Some issues concern food insecurity, lack of industry, high population growth, a weak education field and few job perspectives outside subsistence farming and livestock breeding sectors. |
GDP | $441 billion (Dec. 2021) |
Pro-capite GDP (Purchasing power parity) | $2422 (Dec. 2021) |
Exports | $2.62 billion (2020) |
Export partner | UAE 66.8%, China 8.58%, Canada 6.89%, Mali 4.13%, Burkina Faso 3.92% (2020) |
Imports | $2.75 billion (2020) |
Import partner | China 17.4%, France 15%, United States 9.09%, Nigeria 5.03%, Thailand 4.41%, India 4.1% (2020) |
Trade With Italy | $ 25,4 million (2021) |
Population | 24.484.587 (2022) |
Population Growth | 3,66% (2022 est.) |
Ethnicities | Hausa 53.1%, Zarma/Songhai 21.2%, Tuareg 11%, Fulani (Peuhl) 6.5%, Kanuri 5.9%, Gurma 0.8%, Arab 0.4%, Tubu 0.4%, other 0.9% |
Languages | French (official), Hausa, Djerma |
Religions | Islamic 99.3%, Christian 0.3%, Animist 0.2% |
Urbanization | 16,9% (2022) |
Literacy | 35.1% |
Independent since 1960, the West African state of Niger borders with Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin to the south, Mali and Burkina Faso to the west, Chad to the east, and Algeria and Libya to the north. Its population is estimated to be 24.1 million, divided into nine ethnic groups. The country’s official language is French.
Because of its geographic position Niger is at the centre of migration routes towards the Mediterranean. It has been the target of multiple attacks by jihadist groups based in the Sahel and in the Lake Chad region. Thanks to its abundant uranium fields, Niger is also one of the most important players in the energy market in the region. This strategic mix of factors explains why the country is at the centre of many defence and humanitarian initiatives.
Trade flows between Italy and Niger amount to €25 million in 2021. Italian exports to Niger mainly comprise clothing items, machinery for general and special uses, and food, while imports from the country include components for the automotive and aerospace industries. To support Niger in tackling instability in the Sahel, Italy has started a wide range of different partnerships. Since 2018, Italy has been running a military mission to support the Republic of Niger (MISIN), and has subsequently undertaken initiatives to help the country manage the Covid-19 pandemic.