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Iran: the presidential election and Pezeshkian’s victory
Following the result of Iran’s presidential election, Med-Or asked five experts in international politics and the Middle East some questions about the possible domestic and international consequences of the vote.
Following the helicopter crash of May 19, 2024, in which the president Ebrahim Raisi and the Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian died, presidential elections have been set in Iran for June 28. After none of the six main candidates managed to obtain a majority of votes, as required by the Constitution, a second round of elections was held on July 5.
The runoff between the two most voted candidates marked the victory of the reformist candidate Massoud Pezeshkian, with about 55% of the vote against 45% of the conservative rival, Saeed Jalili. Although participation was higher than on June 28 (39%), even in the second round the majority of voters did not go to the polls, marking one of the lowest turnout levels since the 1979 revolution: 49% according to official data.
During the electoral campaign, Pezeshkian emphasized the risks of the regime’s repressive policies, especially toward women and youth, and reiterated his commitment to revitalize the economy. In foreign policy, albeit moderately, was expressed a willingness to improve relations with neighbors and to adopt a more open approach with the West.
At first glance, this approach would seem antithetical to the Raisi presidency and the previous Rouhani and Ahmadinejad administrations. Indeed, the election of the first reformist president since 1997 – the year when Khatami was elected, with Pezeshkian serving as Minister of Health – has raised high expectations for the future of the Islamic Republic. However, questions remain about whether the president can effectively implement the election program and whether the other pivotal elements of the state are actually willing to adapt to the change, including on the foreign policy front.
Given Iran’s importance in the Middle Eastern context, also in light of the ongoing conflicts and complex relations with many neighboring countries and international powers, we interviewed some Italian experts, trying to gather their assessments of the country’s future and, in particular, of the potential consequences, domestic and foreign, that could occur with the election of a reformist candidate. This consideration comes at a delicate time for the Islamic Republic, given the internal political situation, as the elections followed months of tensions and violently suppressed protests, all within the framework of a long-standing economic crisis.
Starting from these consideration and from the possible effects of the election results, we have asked our questions to Riccardo Redaelli, professor of Geopolitics and Asian History and Institutions at Università Cattolica del S. Cuore of Milan and director of the Center for Research on the Southern System and the Wider Mediterranean (CRiSSMA) at the same university; Arturo Varvelli, director of the Rome Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR); Alessia Melcangi, associate professor of Contemporary History of North Africa and the Middle East at La Sapienza University; Germano Dottori, member of the Med-Or Board of Directors; and Anna Maria Cossiga, deputy director of the Med-Or Analysis Unit.
In the last presidential election in Iran, the reformist candidate, Massoud Pezeshkian, won. Could this result represent a turning point for the Islamic Republic, given the previous trajectory drawn by Raisi’s executive?
Riccardo Redaelli: “The answer is no if one thinks that the new president can profoundly change the strategic choices of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI): he has neither the actual powers nor the will nor the necessary internal support to implement a radically different policy on regional geopolitical projection, nuclear negotiations, internal power system arrangements (the famous Nizam). However, the president’s powers, although limited, are not null and void, but depend on continuous and complex negotiation/balancing with the non-elective powers. In the field of projection of the so-called ‘forward defense’ and proxy management, he will not have much leeway – as the more famous reformist president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) already did. He may however try to give new directions Iran’s disastrous economy and especially in the controls about the morality of citizens, which are the element that the population tolerates less, because they humiliate citizens (and especially the youth) in their daily lives. The fact that the regime has not intervened with massive manipulation of the runoff election results (as it did in 2009) demonstrates understanding – at least of part of the Nizam – that there is a need to curtail the stolid, obtuse enforcement of religious rules implemented by the previous president, Raisi. Unless there are radical changes, the president will end up being – as Khatami was before him – more the representative of the moderate opposition to the radical conservatives than the real decision maker”.
Arturo Varvelli: “It is possible that some things will change and that a new political phase with more social openings and different economic choices will begin, especially domestically. However, one should not overestimate the figure of the president who in any case must submit to the rules of an autocratic country, in which the levers of power are more in the hands of structures linked to the Supreme Leader than of the president. Internationally, Iran will continue to feel a sense of encirclement by other regional and international powers, which is likely to be heightened by Trump’s possible election victory in the United States. Tehran will continue to support a network of regional alliances, composed of state and non-state actors, which has been termed the Axis of Resistance, whose purpose is to defend Iranian interests. The Islamic Republic’s relationship with these proxy actors will be one of the first evidence to be observed to understand whether anything will change internationally. But the variables are too numerous to make current predictions”.
Alessia Melcangi: “It is difficult to say whether the election of a reformist after several years can really draw a different trajectory from that of the previous Raisi executive essentially for two reasons: the positions and initiatives of the reformists, since the end of the Khatami government (1997-2005), have been long discredited and marginalized by a system increasingly controlled by the Pasdaran and the more conservative forces, which have consistently accused the moderates of being too weak with the West. Although popular demands, even in the wake of numerous protests in recent months, are clearly in favor of a return to reformism, it seems unlikely to foresee a decisive future change. The second reason relates to the role played by the president of the Republic of Iran, who, according to the Constitution, has powers limited by the presence of the non-elective offices with religious legitimacy (the Rahbar), especially in some areas, such as foreign policy. Additionally, the Parliament can block the government actions by challenging its ministers. Because of this, it is even more complex to imagine a real change in domestic policy for the new Pezeshkian government.
Germano Dottori: “It is obviously premature to speculate on a turning point, but the significance of this result can hardly be underestimated. There are at least two reasons why it is significant: the first is that the regime’s leadership has understood that without a candidate external to the more conservative bloc, voter turnout would have been extremely low, further highlighting the rift between the authorities and the people that emerged after the prolonged women’s uprising. The second is that the most pragmatic voters took advantage of the opportunity given to them to convey in a concrete way the idea of the need for change. In the second round, many more eligible voters voted, and turnout played an important role in determining the victory of the reformist candidate. It should be stressed again that the fundamental problem in Iran is a crisis of legitimacy of Islamic institutions that stems not from the defect of political pluralism, but from the imposition of the religious norm, which forces young people not to live their affectivity freely, denying them a right to which they are naturally very sensitive. To cite just one figure: the chador-born republic now boasts one of the highest-performing cosmetic surgeries on the planet, to which women and men resort massively as if it were a status symbol-a little-known phenomenon that would certainly astonish Khomeini if he were still alive. Pezeshkian has promised more tolerance, but it remains to be seen whether he can overcome the notion that makes the veil and sober customs a moral pillar of Islamic institutions”.
Anna Maria Cossiga: "The election of Pezeshkian as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran marks the return of reformists to the country’s highest elective office for the first time since 2005. However, it is necessary to break out of the purely Western view of the concept of "reformism", distinguishing it from the Iranian-born concept and not falling into the mistake of thinking that radical changes are possible. Pezeshkian himself had in the past defended the use of the Chador, Iran’s full veil, and we should not forget that the selection of candidates is always an expression of the establishment. Moreover, the new president has limited powers on strategic issues – being responsible for implementing the broad policy guidelines set by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei."
Standing for a moment longer on the domestic situation in the country, we also asked Riccardo Redaelli what were the main domestic political issues and themes that dominated the campaign and how did they influence the election results:
“This electoral campaign has been particularly short and characterized by the impossibility of criticizing the predecessor, since his sudden demise had made him a shahid of the IRI. Moreover, many topics – such as regional proxies, nuclear power, the regime’s most strategic choices – are taboo and cannot be explicitly addressed. In fact, to many, the endorsement as a candidate of Massoud Pezeshkian by the Guardian Council, inside and outside Iran, seemed only an illusion. It was seen as a way to persuade a few more citizens to participate in the presidential elections rituals in an Islamic Republic strained by years of brutal suppression of popular protests and an economic crisis resulting from the geopolitical adventurism and corruption of the regime. The prevailing view was that the increasingly repressive power system had accepted him as a candidate because it was worried about mass abstention, which would undermine the rhetoric of popular participation, viewed as a formal legitimizer of a regime hated by the vast majority of Iranians. Pezeshkian is not a crowd pleaser, nor a charismatic leader as Khatami might have been. In previous contexts he had performed modestly. However, he played his cards right, highlighting the excesses of "moral" repression against citizens, particularly women and youth. He was very insistent on the consequences of this rigidity on the daily lives of Iranians; he obviously emphasized the problems of the corrupt and inefficient economy; and he revived "his president" Khatami’s policy of the dialogue towards foreign countries, particularly the Arab countries and the Gulf monarchies, but also toward the West (albeit cautiously)".
Moving into the specifics of certain issues raised by the election results, particularly concerning Iran’s role in the complex geopolitical mosaic of the Middle East, we broadened the perspective of our questions with our interlocutors, entering with them into the merits of some individual issues. Therefore, precisely by broadening our gaze to international scenarios, we asked Anna Maria Cossiga how Iran’s posture can change in Gaza and, especially, in Lebanon with the passage of the government into the hands of the reformists.
“On the external front, the new government, though a bearer of moderate instances, is expected to stand in continuity with the previous one, ensuring, therefore, support for both the Palestinian cause and the main proxies in the region: from Hamas to Hezbollah, the support for two of the main members of "the Axis of Resistance" is expected to remain unchanged. Even in light of the limited powers enjoyed by the new president, a change in strategy and an opening toward possible de-escalation in the short term by Tehran does not seem imminent. It should be noted, however, that any easing of tensions could come from an exogenous factor to the conflict itself, such as the U.S. presidential election in November 2024”.
While on the other hand, we asked Alessia Melcangi whether with the passage of the government into the hands of the reformists could there be any changes in Iran’s Advanced Defense strategy and, in particular, in the relationship with the proxies of the Axis of Resistance: “The management of the “Forward Defense” strategy, based on the funding and training of proxy forces is entrusted to the Pasdaran, who are the most conservative and anti-Western groups. This foreign policy set-up was most recently tested with the Gaza War, which has, in addition, strengthened ties between Tehran and proxies in an anti-Israeli and anti-western function, as was the case in Iraq, Syria and Yemen during the past two decades. In this area, too, President Pezeshkian will have little room for maneuver, a condition that, on the other hand, could change, at the level of international diplomacy, as already announced by the new president who has said he is willing to revive dialogue with the West, which has been steadily deteriorating since the end of the Rouhani presidency”.
Looking at the Gulf area, how might change Tehran’s relations with the Gulf monarchies? Prof Redaelli answers that “It is a very Western illusion to imagine that a moderate reformist president could significantly improve relations with Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the other Gulf monarchies hostile to Tehran. Because rapprochement with UAE and KSA was a pragmatic choice, dictated by the need to reduce tensions (and to stop the Houthi firing of missiles on KSA), it does not reduce mistrust and fundamental differences. Thus, Gulf Arab princes and emirs care little that there is a president who speaks in a conciliatory manner. They care about compromise with the real powers of the deep state; and it is well known along the Arab side of the Gulf that Pezeshkian will not have much leeway with the Pasdaran or with the strategic choices of advanced regional projection”.
Another issue on which questions could arise is that on the Iranian nuclear deal. In this regard, we asked Germano Dottori whether with the new reform-minded executive, a revival of the JCPOA could be considered. In more details, considering the U.S. elections in November, and how might change the relations between Tehran and Washington. “It is very likely that the new president will try to propitiate in some way the start of a new negotiating process. It is quite other to say, however, that he may succeed in doing so. To revive the economy a softening of sanctions is required. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Pezeshkian will explore the possibility of reviving the JCPOA, sunk in 2018 by Trump, or at least replacing it with a different arrangement. It goes without saying, however, that any negotiation would be particularly difficult: because a re-elected Trump intent on cementing his reputation as a deal maker would certainly want it to be more stringent, verifiable, and lasting than the one torpedoed six years ago, while in Tehran they feel the opposite need not to tie their hands too much. Presumably, Pezeshkian will enjoy wider margins of initiative domestically than internationally. The situation could change if the newly elected president succeeds in triggering, after the recent showdown, a process of détente with Israel: at the moment, however, this possibility seems unfortunately remote, not least because on the line of dialogue with the so-called "Zionist entity" should move important regime actors who instead thrive on the logic of confrontation and feeding regional instability."
To the same question Arturo Varvelli told us that “I think Iran will continue in any case to look to China and Russia as friendly powers, but the new president may try to preserve and strengthen the openings made toward the Gulf Arab countries and find a modus vivendi with Israel. I hope I am wrong, but I don’t think JCPOA is an option on the table. It is part of a political project that is currently too distant. Instead, I believe the balance in the region will be based on deterrence and dissuasion as noted in the limited military exchange between Israel and Iran a few months ago. This is a fragile balance that may be undermined by an expansion of the Gaza conflict to Lebanon, which the international community should see as a real danger that should be addressed preemptively. Widening the discourse, I believe that a second Trump administration could aim to revitalize the Abraham Accords, which were a boast of the first administration. However, it is clear that these cannot succeed before the end of Israel’s military action and the cessation of hostilities in Gaza. It is also true that the Abraham Accords have shown a significant limitation. They did not constitute a substitute for the Palestinian path to independence. They represented a shortcut that did not work. Even an eventual Trump administration will have to start from this consideration. Arab countries and Israel while united by many interests will no longer be able to bypass the political knots”.
Finally, an important question, even in light of the ongoing conflicts between Ukraine and Gaza, is also Tehran’s relationship with Moscow and Beijing. In particular, whether this might change after the election results. For Germano Dottori in fact, "Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that Russia and China were (and still are) parties to the JPCOA, from which they have not withdrawn. Both Moscow and Beijing also boast important relations with Tehran, that the new president is unlikely to want to change. In observing what Pezeshkian will try to do, we should not think of a reversal of the Islamic Republic’s overall geopolitical posture, which is unimaginable at the moment. Rather, we might anticipate an expansion of its vectors, which from our perspective would still signify progress and likely better align with Iran’s commercial aspirations, opening up new markets. After all, this would be a choice comparable to those made, from different starting points, by Erdogan’s Turkey and Bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia, firmly anchored in the West but also active in groupings of a different sign such as the SCO and the Brics”.
Several open questions remain on the table, not only about Iran’s future, but also about the role Iran will play in the coming months and years in the Middle East region and also internationally, in a context of increasing competition between large and medium-sized powers. Certainly, also in light of the stabilization processes that had been triggered in the Middle East region prior to October 7 and then, after the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the role that Iran will play in the coming years could be certainly highly significant in the complex regional balances, as well as in other areas of the globe.
