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Oman’s Connectivity Strategy Maximizes Multi-Alignment
From infrastructure to trade agreements: how Muscat is strengthening its political relations through logistics. The analysis by Eleonora Ardemagni
Oman’s current connectivity strategy has two primary goals: investing in maritime infrastructures and ports abroad, and strengthening the international positioning of national ports, capitalizing on geopolitical rivalries. In both cases, the strategy maximizes Muscat’s multi-aligned foreign policy. From one hand, the Sultanate is working to develop infrastructural partnerships in the Indian Ocean region, thus building upon its historical foreign policy linkages. This goal suggests Oman aims to get closer to the “Gulf business model” than before, thus partly resembling the global-oriented approach of the Emirati giants companies DP World (Dubai) and Abu Dhabi Ports Group (ADPG). Such an effort also fits into Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said’s push for economic diversification, as outlined by “Vision 2040”.
On the other hand, Muscat is boosting cooperation with foreign companies to develop its own maritime infrastructures, especially its three main ports (Sohar in the north; Duqm in the Indian Ocean; Salalah in the south), to scale up their role in the global connectivity network. The Sultanate especially looks at east: in 2023, 92% of the Omani exported crude oil went to China.
Given Oman’s unique geographical position, there’s also great interest by regional and international powers for a foothold in the Sultanate, meaning a military base or the military access to Omani facilities. The expansion of ports in Oman -which multiplies dual use possibilities-, combined with rising geostrategic competition among powers, makes the appetite for a facility in the Sultanate potentially higher than in the past. This especially regards power balances among the US, China and India.
Ports Infrastructures: Playing Globally
Building upon its maritime tradition, Oman is envisaging infrastructural investments abroad. Asyad Group, the national integrated logistics provider supported by the Oman Investment Authority (the sultanate’s sovereign wealth fund), is planning investments in other continents. This occurs twenty-years exactly after its foundation: Asyad Group currently manages the port of Sohar in partnership with the port of Rotterdam, the Duqm port partnering with Antwerp port, and Salalah port facilities in collaboration with Maersk. Now the Sultanate’s company is working not only to boost domestic ports’ connectivity, but also to acquire stakes in maritime infrastructures abroad. In recent interviews, the CEO of Asyad outlined the company’s willingness to invest out of Oman, to acquire majority stakes in ports located in Far East, East Africa and the Indian subcontinent.
On February 16-17, 2025, Oman hosted the Indian Ocean Conference, the annual international gathering to enhance regional cooperation and address challenges in the Indian Ocean region. The conference, organized by the Omani Foreign Ministry in collaboration with the India Foundation and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, was a showcase for the Sultanate’s new, bolder approach to domestic infrastructures. The minister of foreign affairs Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi stated the conference provides the occasion to “familiarize the participants with the capabilities enjoyed by the Sultanate of Oman in various aspects, including infrastructure and ports, which enhance Oman as an attractive investment destination”. Al Busaidi stressed that Vision 2040 aims to balance economic growth and environment conservation “especially in the sectors of the blue economy, port infrastructure, and logistics services”. Blue economy and maritime safety are pillars of another multilateral platform joined by Muscat, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).
Regarding maritime routes, the Red Sea crisis, due to the Houthis’ attacks from Yemen against shipping, emphasizes the Sultanate’s strategic location. Oman is the only GCC state with a direct access to the Indian Ocean: Fujairah, the only UAE’s emirate placed beyond the Hormuz Strait, has however to navigate import/export through the Gulf of Oman, which now and then has revealed unsafe due to Iranian attacks. Conversely, Oman can’t be chocked by potential turmoil or even interdiction in the straits, despite instability around choke-points (Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb) can affect its traffic volumes.
During the most acute phase of the Red Sea crisis, Omani ports registered in fact some losses: in the first half of 2024, Salalah port reported a 16% decline in container volumes. Like neighbouring Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Sultanate has been quick to adapt, organizing inland transport from Duqm and Salalah ports: Salalah launched a multimodal service connecting to Jeddah port in Saudi Arabia (taking four to five days and thus providing an alternative, shorter route to the Cape of Good Hope), and opted for joining since 2025 the “Gemini Cooperation”, a global vessel sharing agreement between Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd companies. With the same goal, Duqm developed inland roads to connect with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Given its geographical location, the Sultanate - which is part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) like GCC neighbours - can build upon the slowing of the India-Middle East-Europe-Economic Corridor (IMEC) project to consolidate its rising infrastructural position between the Middle East and Asia. However, Muscat would also benefit from the implementation of the IMEC Corridor due to its growing interdependence with the Emirati infrastructure.
Duqm and the others. The Commercial-Strategic Expansion of the Omani Ports
Oman is actively capitalizing on geopolitical rivalries to increase investments at home and boost ports’ connectivity (Sohar, Duqm, Salalah), often partnering with states that compete each other (US, India, China). Cooperation between Oman and the UAE is going to increase traffic volumes at Sohar port. In 2024, during the Sultan’s second state visit to Abu Dhabi, Oman and the UAE expanded the joint venture for a rail project among Oman Rail, Etihad Rail and Mubadala. The 3 billion dollars project, rebranded Hafeet Rail since 2024, aims to develop and operate a railway network to link Sohar port, in the north of Oman, to Al Ain in the inner Abu Dhabi emirate: the Emirati Etihad Rail and the Omani ASYAD Group hold the largest shareholder stakes in the joint venture. The goal is to support the movement of bulk commodities and containerised cargo: the railway will be completed by the end of 2027. In 2025, Indian and Chinese companies secured construction contracts for railway facilities.
Linking Sohar port to the interior of the Sultanate, and with trade-oriented countries as the neighbour UAE, will incentivize Oman’s role in wider connectivity networks. In the north of Oman, Hutchison Ports Sohar (a joint venture between the Hong Kong-based Hutchison and Omani companies), signed in 2022 a framework agreement to develop and operate for thirty-years the port of Khasab, in the Musandam Peninsula. About Salalah port in the south, the expansion project has just concluded, with the upgrades of all six berths and the expansion of the container terminal capacity.
The port of Duqm, officially inaugurated in 2022, is a strategic driver for the Sultanate: it supports the economic diversification goal and, at the same time, the port encapsulates the Sultanate’s multiple alliances. In terms of investments, the Indian Adani Group is currently in talks with Omani authorities to develop the Special Economic Zone at Duqm (SEZAD), building upon a 2017 memorandum. The development of the China-Oman Industrial Park in Duqm, focused on manufacturing industries, continues: the third project of the industrial city, also including building materials and electrical appliances, was inaugurated in 2024 .
Regarding the strategic side, the US, the UK and India signed with Oman defense-related deals about Duqm. In 2019, the US signed an updated Strategic Framework Agreement with Oman which granted the access to ports and airports including Duqm (able to host US aircraft carriers). In 2019, the UK opened a permanent military base in Duqm focused on logistics and training activities; in 2017, Oman had already granted to the British navy the use of the port. In 2024, India secured for its navy a specific zone of the port, also to support New Delhi’s deployment against piracy in the Arabian Sea; in 2018 India’s navy had already gained the access to the port.
China’s Navy Leans on Salalah: No Need for a Permanent Base?
Oman is a battlefield of geopolitical competition between China and India, China and the US: the Sultanate has capitalized on these rivalries so far to strengthen its regional, multi-aligned position. In 2023, the White House was briefed about Beijing’s plan to open a military base in Oman. China invested in the civilian development of Duqm port, and this would make easier for Beijing to establish a military facility there, following the same approach showed in Djibouti. In 2016, China signed in fact a fifty-year lease with the Special Economic Zone Authority in Duqm to co-develop the China-Oman Industrial Park.
Nevertheless, Duqm isn’t the current Chinese strategic pivot in Oman, which is instead Salalah port. Since 2010, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) uses to call Salalah port for replenishment and crew liberty, with US analysts estimating that Salalah achieved a “de facto facility status” for China, stressing that Djibouti enjoys nearly as many of the visits the PLAN did to Salalah. In 2023, the Chinese embassy and the Omani foreign ministry erected just in Salalah a monument to Zheng He, a 15th century Chinese Muslim admiral, stressing friendly relations. For Oman, multi-alignment serves more and more both its economic and geostrategic goals.
